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new electrical energy generation resources, including bidding and other competitive acquisition programs, and requests for
proposal type solicitations; AB 1431
(Moore), which would have required the
PUC to examine wholesale cellular
telephone rates in the major metropolitan
markets to determine the costs, including
a fair profit, to provide wholesale cellular
telephone service in each of those
markets, and to base wholesales rates on
those costs; AB 558 (Polanco) and AB
314 (Moore), both of which related to the
conditions under which Caller ID may be
offered in California; SB 815 (Rosenthal),
which would have prohibited an owner or
operator of a coin-activated telephone
available for public use or any telephone
corporation from making any charge for
the use of a calling card or collect call for
any telephone call made from a coin or
coinless customer-owned pay telephone _
above and beyond the surcharge applicable to users of credit cards for those
calls; AB 847 (Polanco), which would
have authorized the PUC, as an alternative
to the suspension, revocation, or amendment of a certificate for a highway common carrier or the permit of a household
goods carrier, to impose a fine of up to
$20,000, instead of $5,000, for a first offense; SB 636 (Calderon), which would
have authorized the use of money in the
PUC's Transportation Rate Fund for conducting studies and research into how to
increase the public benefits attained from
highway carriers in the areas of safety,
environment, productivity, and traffic
congestion management; SB 692 (Rosenthal), which would have directed the PUC
to require every electrical, gas, and
telephone corporation subject to its jurisdiction to transmit to its customers or subscribers, together with its bill for services,
a legal notice which describes intervenor
groups by name, address, and telephone
number; SB 743 (Rosenthal), which
would have required the PUC to require
that any telephone corporation which requests approval of the modernization of its
telephone network with fiber optics also
establish and provide an independent
source of power for the telephone network
in the case of a public emergency that
could curtail electric power; AB 844
(Polanco), which would have authorized
the PUC to cancel, suspend, or revoke a
certificate or operating permit upon the
conviction of a charter-party carrier of any
felony; AB 846 (Polanco), which would
have required the PUC, if, after a hearing,
it finds that a highway permit carrier or a
household goods carrier has continued to
operate as such after its certificate or permit has been suspended pursuant to exist-
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ing law, to either revoke the certificate or
permit of the carrier or to impose upon the
holder of the permit(s) a civil penalty of
not less than $ I ,000 nor more than $5,000
for each day of unlawful operations; AB
90 (Moore), which would have required
the PUC, in establishing rates for an
electrical, gas, telephone, or water corporation, to develop procedures for these
utilities to recover, through their rates and
charges, the actual amount of local taxes,
fees, and assessments, and to adjust rates
to correct for any differences between actual expenditures and amounts recovered
in this regard; AB 230 (Hauser), which
would have required those public utilities
which furnish residential service to provide with their bills a statement indicating
the customer's consumption of electricity,
gas, or water during the corresponding
billing period one year previously and the
number of days in, and charges for, that
billing period; AB 379 (Moore), which
would have created a Department of
Telecommunications and Information
Resource Management to recommend to
the Governor and the legislature elements
of a state telecommunications and information resource policy; AB 1792 (Harvey), which would have required the PUC
to develop and implement cost estimates
for the marginal costs of generation, bulk
transmission, and energy costs for different classes of consumers of electrical
energy, including but not limited to
agricultural use and residential use, for the
purpose of determining reasonable and
just rates for electrical energy; ACA 30
(Bates), which would have required the
legislature to provide for five public utility
districts and provided for the election of
the PUC commissioners; and AB 1260
(Chacon), which would have established
procedures applicable to dump truck carriers and household goods carriers that
provide for appeal of any interim, interlocutory, or other order of the PUC to a
state court of appeal.

FUTURE MEETINGS:
The full Commission usually meets
every other Wednesday in San Francisco.

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
President: John M. Seitman
Executive Officer: Herbert Rosenthal
(415) 561-8200 and (213) 580-5000
Toll-Free Complaint Number: J-800843-9053

The State Bar of California was created
by legislative act in 1927 and codified in
the California Constitution at Article VI,
section 9. The State Bar was established

as a public corporation within the judicial
branch of government, and membership is
a requirement for all attorneys practicing
law in California. Today, the State Bar has
over 128,000 members, which equals approximately 17% of the nation's population of lawyers.
The State Bar Act, Business and
Professions Code section 6000 et seq.,
designates a Board of Governors to run the
State Bar. The Board President is elected
by the Board of Governors at its June
meeting and serves a one-year term beginning in September. Only governors who
have served on the Board for three years
are eligible to run for President.
The Board consists of 23 membersseventeen licensed attorneys and six nonlawyer public members. Of the attorneys,
sixteen of them-including the President-are elected to the Board by lawyers
in nine geographic districts. A representative of the California Young Lawyers
Association (CYLA), appointed by that
organization's Board of Directors, also
sits on the Board. The six public members
are variously selected by the Governor,
Assembly Speaker, and Senate Rules
Committee, and confirmed by the state
Senate. Each Board member serves a
three-year term, except for the CYLA representative (who serves for one year) and
the Board President (who serves a fourth
year when elected to the presidency). The
terms are staggered to provide for the
selection of five attorneys and two public
members each year.
The State Bar includes twenty standing
committees; fourteen special committees,
addressing specific issues; sixteen sections covering fourteen substantive areas
of law; Bar service programs; and the
Conference of Delegates, which gives a
representative voice to 291 local, ethnic,
and specialty bar associations statewide.
The State Bar and its subdivisions perform a myriad of functions which fall into
six major categories: (I) testing State Bar
applicants and accrediting law schools;
(2) enforcing the State Bar Act and the
Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct,
which are codified at section 6076 of the
Business and Professions Code, and
promoting competence-based education;
(3) ensuring the delivery of and access to
legal services; (4) educating the public;
(5) improving the administration of justice; and (6) providing member services.

MAJOR PROJECTS:
Bar's ADR Bill Rejected in Legislature. Fulfilling a top priority of Board of
Governors President John Seitman, the
Bar recently sponsored an ambitious bill
to expand the use of alternative dispute
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resolution (ADR) in both civil and
criminal matters. AB 301 I (Isenberg) was
intended to codify a proposal formulated
by the Bar's Joint Taskforce on Access to
Justice in its 1991 Alternative Dispute
Resolution Action Plan, which identified
16 proposals for expanding the use and
availability of ADR to resolve disputes.
[11:2 CRLR 181-82]
AB 3011 would have specifically
authorized the use of ADR in both civil
and criminal matters, and contained
numerous measures-some mandatory,
others optional-to encourage its use
wherever possible. With regard to civil
matters, it provided that courts must require plaintiffs, upon filing a complaint, to
serve a specific form on defendants
regarding ADR, informing defendants of
the state's policy to resolve disputes
without litigation if possible and of the
need to meet and confer about the possibility of various types of ADR, including
mediation, arbitration, neutral case
evaluation, minitrials, summary jury trials, and neutral factfinding. If the parties
do not agree on an ADR process, the court
would be authorized to hold an ADR assessment conference to consider an appropriate ADR process. Under the bill,
parties must meet and confer to discuss the
possibility of ADR prior to the ADR assessment conference, which shall take
place no sooner than 120 days after the
filing of the complaint. If the court
chooses to hold an assessment conference,
the court shall review available ADR
processes with the parties; may refer the
case to ADR (in consultation with the local
bar association and ADR providers to ensure availability); and may determine the
amount of discovery for the ADR process.
With regard to criminal matters, the
bill contained legislative findings and declarations relative to the success of other
states' ADR programs for the resolution of
disputes between victims and criminal
defendants. The bill would have permitted
pre-plea and pre-sentencing probation
reports to include a recommendation that,
as a condition of probation, the defendant
participate in a victim-offender mediation
program (if one is available and the victim
consents). AB 30 I 1 would also have
modified misdemeanor diversion statutes
to allow participation in victim-offender
mediation programs as a condition of
diversion-again, if both the victim and
the defendant consent to participation and
if an appropriate program is available.
The Bar stated that the purpose of the
bill was to reduce the cost, time, and stress
of civil litigation by promoting appropriate resolution of civil disputes
before substantial trial preparation costs

have been incurred and before polarization of the parties has resulted. The bill
attempted to require parties, attorneys,
and courts to consider ADR without requiring ADR itself. In the criminal arena,
the bill sought to give a victim the right to
confront the person who committed the
offense with the consequences of the offense, and also to negotiate a restitution
agreement. This process is intended to
reduce the crime victim's sense of powerlessness and to force the defendant to take
personal responsibility for his or her action.
Not many of the Bar's recent forays
into the legislature have been successful,
and this one was no exception. The powerful California Trial Lawyers Association
(CTLA) initially announced opposition to
the bill unless it was amended to exclude
personal injury and wrongful death cases
from the ADR system created by the bill.
Many of these cases are already subject to
court referral to arbitration and fast-track
processes. Later, CTLA stated that if personal injury and wrongful death cases
were not excluded from the bill, it might
support the bill subject to a number of
conditions, including coverage of all cases
(including all criminal cases and all
domestic violence matters), a ban on judicial referral of personal injury and wrongful death cases to ADR processes, and
reinstatement of the so-called "Royal
Globe" cause of action for bad faith
against insurers for unfair claims settlement practices. In some circles, this last
condition was referred to as a "poison pill"
term, as it surely would have aroused the
insurance industry to oppose the bill.
The California Association of District
Attorneys (CDAA) opposed AB 301 I's
provisions for ADR in criminal cases.
CDAA stated that it disagreed with
proposals that encourage victims to meet
with their perpetrators as a method of
negotiating restitution agreements.
CDAA does not oppose counseling of
defendants regarding their offense, their
duty to take responsibility for their action,
and their need to make restitution; however, it objected to involving victims in the
process of establishing the proper level of
restitution through a victim/offender
mediation process.
The political battle over the bill in the
legislature was short-lived, vicious, and
typical of the Bar's record in the legislature despite a well-funded lobbying corps.
On May 6, the Bar enjoyed a temporary
victory when the Assembly Judiciary
Committee-chaired by bill author Phil
Isenberg-passed AB 301 I by a 6-2 vote,
but only after the Bar struck an eleventhhour deal with CDAA. Just before the
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hearing on the bill, Bar officials agreed to
rewrite the bill's criminal provisions to
make criminal ADR completely optional
at the county level, with district attorneys
having sole authority to approve establishment of pre- and post-filing ADR
programs. CDAA withheld its opposition,
and the bill passed. However, Bar lobbyist
Mark Harris went too far, publicly boasting about the Bar's rare defeat of CTLA
and accusing CTLA of attempting to kill
the Bar's dues bill in retaliation (see infra).
Even with one of the best authors in the
Assembly, the bill got no further; the Assembly Ways and Means Committee
rejected it on May 20, granted it reconsideration, and rejected it again on May
26. CTLA opposition was crucial; however, other players-including the
California Judges Association-expressed concerns about the potential fiscal
impact of the bill and its possible disruption of existing fast-track processes.
Dues Bill Stalled. The State Bar's only
other legislative priority in 1992 appears
to be its dues bill. The Bar's statutory
authority to demand dues from its members expires every two years, and the
legislature must redelegate that authority
and approve the annual dues level. As
compared with prior Bar dues bills, AB
2296 (Isenberg) seeks a modest $20 increase in mandatory licensing fees, from
$478 annually to $498. [ 12:2 CRLR 193]
The bill sailed through the Assembly by
April 6, but-at this writing-has been
stalled in the Senate Judiciary Committee
ever since.
A combination of factors appears to be
working against the Bar in the legislature:
( 1) a union unhappy with Bar
management's handling of an ongoing
labor dispute between the Bar and its
unionized employees (many of whom periodically walk out) has sought refuge in
the legislature, and has apparently convinced the Senate Judiciary Committee to
stall the dues bill until Bar management
softens its stance; (2) the recession and the
statewide budget crisis have taken firm
hold over the legislature, resulting in its
consistent refusal to approve bills which
will result in increased expenditures
and/or increase licensing fees; (3) a growing movement to disintegrate the integrated State Bar, caused in part by attorney dissatisfaction over the Bar's high
licensing fees and its tendency to spend at
least some of its members' compelled dues
on causes with which not all its members
agree, as exposed in the Keller case (see
infra LITIGATION); and (4) the traditional hostility of Senate Judiciary Committee
Chair Bill Lockyer toward the Bar. At this
writing, no hearing is set on AB 2296.
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Bar Discipline System to Record
Decisions. The State Bar recently announced its publication of the California
State Bar Court Reporter, the official
record of State Bar Court disciplinary
decisions. In addition to the full text of
published opinions of the State Bar Court
Review Department, the Reporter includes comprehensive headnotes, case
summaries, and a detailed index and
digest.
Long advocated by former State Bar
Discipline Monitor Robert C. Fellmeth as
one means of enhancing the consistency
of State Bar Court decisions and increasing the possibility of settlements [/ 1:4
CRLR JO], the Bar's publication of the
Reporter became especially important last
year when the California Supreme Court
adopted "finality rules" which have significantly reduced the number of Bar discipline cases going to the Supreme Court
for review and decision. { 11: 1 CRLR 148J
In his final report ending a five-year term
as Discipline Monitor, Fellmeth noted that
"[t]he proposed Reporter has symbolic as
well as practical significance. In a sense,
it becomes the flagship for the state's discipline efforts. Its existence says that these
cases-this area of Jaw and the ethical
obligations of attorneys-are of great importance and worth of official report."
State Bar Rulemaking. The following
is a status update on proposed regulatory
amendments considered by the State Bar
in recent months:
-Use of the Term "Certified
Specialist." At its March meeting, the
Board of Governors repealed Rule of
Professional Conduct l-400(D)(6), which
prohibited attorneys from advertising as a
"certified specialist" unless actually certified by the Bar's Board of Legal
Specialization. A similar Illinois rule was
invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Jllinois. [12: 1 CRLR
193] This rule change must be approved
by the California Supreme Court.
Also in March, the Board of
Governors' Committee on Education and
Competence decided to release for public
comment proposed new Rule l400(E)(ll), which would create a rebuttable presumption that a "communication" which states or implies that a member is a certified specialist violates the
Bar's advertising rule unless the communication also states the complete name
of the entity which granted the certification. The public comment period on this
proposal was scheduled to close on June
18.

-Trust Account Recordkeeping. The
Committee on Education and Competence
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was scheduled to review the public comments received on its revised version of
amendments to Rule 4-I00(C), regarding
client trust account recordkeeping standards, at its May I meeting. Backing away
from an expansive original version of the
rule in December 1991 {12:1 CRLR 19293 }, the Committee released a narrower
version for comment until March 12. The
modified version focuses only on retention of trust account financial records. A
previous requirement that the trust account be maintained in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles
was eliminated in the second version as
being unduly burdensome to members. A
requirement that members maintain
records to identify all their client trust
accounts was added to the second version
to ensure that all such accounts can be
located should a question arise.
Due to civil unrest in Los Angeles following the acquittals of four Los Angeles
Police Department officers charged with
using excessive force on Los Angeles resident Rodney King, the Bar cancelled its
May I meeting; the Committee was
scheduled to take up Rule 4-1 00(C) at its
June 5 meeting.
-"Gender Bias" Rule. On May II, a
special Bar committee approved a
revamped version of a rule to prohibit
discrimination in legal advocacy. The socalled "gender bias" rule has been expanded and modified several times { 12: 1
CRLR 193]; the May 11 version would
actually create two new Rules of Professional Conduct--0ne banning discrimination in legal employment and another banning discrimination on the part of a lawyer
while he/she is engaged in the representation of a client.
The proposed employment discrimination rule would provide that "in the
management or operation of a law practice
a [State Bar] member shall not unlawfully
discriminate or knowingly permit unlawful discrimination on the basis of race,
national origin, sex, sexual orientation,
religion, age or disability in: (I) hiring,
promoting, discharging or otherwise
determining the conditions of employment of any person; or (2) accepting or
terminating representation of any client."
The proposed general bias rule would
provide that "while engaged in the practice of law, a member shall not discriminate against, or threaten, harass, intimidate or denigrate any other person on
the basis of race, national origin, sex,
sexual orientation, religion, age or disability." Another section of the rule, intended to address widespread concerns
about the rule's impact on the first amendment rights of attorneys and on their

obligation to vigorously represent all
clients, reads as follows: "This rule does
not prohibit activities constituting
legitimate advocacy when race, national
origin, sex, sexual orientation, religion,
age or disability are relevant to issues in
the engagement."
The Bar's Committee on Education
and Competence was expected to address
the modified version of this rule at its July
meeting; at that time, it may decide to
release the proposal for a 90-day comment
period.
-Attorney-Client Sex. On January 13,
the Bar resubmitted to the California
Supreme Court its proposed Rule of
Professional Conduct 3-120, which (with
some exceptions) prohibits attorneys from
requiring or demanding sexual relations
with a client incident to or as a condition
of any professional representation;
employing coercion, intimidation, or
undue influence in entering into sexual
relations with a client; or accepting or
continuing representation of a client with
whom the member has sexual relations if
such sexual relations cause the member to
perform legal services incompetently.
{12:J CRLR 193] At this writing, the
Court has not acted on the proposed rule.
Assemblymember Lucille Roybal-Allard,
whose 1989 legislation compelled the Bar
to adopt an attorney-client sex rule, is still
pursuing AB 1400 (see infra LEGISLATION) in case the Court rejects the rule.
-Attorney Confidentiality.
On
January 24, the Committee on Education
and Competence voted to release a third
version of proposed new Rule of Professional Conduct 3-100, regarding State Bar
members' "duty to maintain client confidence and secrets inviolate," for a 90day public comment period. As published
on January 24, the rule specifies an
attorney's duty "to maintain inviolate the
confidence, and, at every peril to himself
or herself, to preserve the secrets of a
client." The rule provides permissive exceptions to a member's duty of confidentiality (I) where the client consents to
disclosure, and (2) to the extent the member reasonably believes necessary to
prevent the commission of a criminal act
that the member believes is imminently
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. The Committee was scheduled to
review the public comments received on
the new version at its June 5 meeting.
-Reinstatement to Practice Law. At its
February meeting, the Board of Governors
approved the proposal of the Committee
on Admissions and Discipline to amend
Rule 662 of the Bar's Transitional Rules
of Procedure. Prior to its amendment, Rule
662 provided that an attorney who has
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been disbarred or has resigned with charges pending must wait for a period of at
least five years following such disbarment, resignation, or other legal qualification from practice before filing a first petition for reinstatement to the practice of
law. However, the rule provided that the
Discipline Committee could shorten the
time for filing a first petition for reinstatement to a time not less than three years
from disqualification upon a showing of
good cause. The amendment transfers the
adjudication of these applications to shorten time for the filing of reinstatement petitions from the Discipline Committee to the
State Bar Court, and clarifies that a member who resigns from membership without
disciplinary charges pending may file a
first petition for reinstatement at any time.
[12:1 CRLR 193]
Bar Terminates Certification of
Lawyer Referral Service. Following a
heated public hearing on January 17, the
Bar's Legal Services Committee revoked
its conditional certification of Primex
Talking Yellow Pages, a statewide lawyer
referral service (LRS) which failed to
satisfy the Bar's LRS standards in Business and Professions Code section 6155.
The Committee found Primex in violation
of at least eight of the Bar's minimum
standards. Although Primex had applied
for certification, it does not consider itself
a lawyer referral service but rather an "advertising medium" whose services are not
restricted to information about lawyers.
This action is the latest in the Bar's
promised crackdown on uncertified LRSs
and those which are operating in violation
of the Bar's standards. [12:1 CRLR 19394; 11:1 CRLR 149-50] The Los Angeles
County District Attorney's Office had already filed an action against Primex,
charging it with misleading advertising
and unfair competition; that suit is pending in superior court.
LEGISLATION:
AB 1400 (Roybal-Allard), as amended
January 27, would provide that it shall
constitute cause for the imposition of discipline of an attorney for an attorney to
require or demand sexual relations with a
client incident to or as a condition of any
professional representation, to employ
coercion, intimidation, or undue influence
in entering into sexual relations with a
client, or to continue to represent a client
with whom the attorney has sexual relations if they cause the attorney to perform
legal services incompetently in violation
of a specified rule. These restrictions
would not apply to relations with spouses
or ongoing relations that predate the initiation of the attorney-client relationship.

This bill is similar to a proposed Rule of
Professional Conduct currently pending in
the California Supreme Court (see supra
MAJOR PROJECTS). [S. Jud]
AB 2296 (Isenberg). Existing law establishes an annual membership fee for
members of the State Bar for 1992, but
does not establish a membership fee for
later years. As amended March 23, this bill
would establish the annual membership
fee for 1993 and 1994, generally increasing the base fee by $20.
Existing law, until January I, 1993,
authorizes the State Bar's Board of Governors to increase the annual membership
fee by an additional fee for discipline augmentation ofnot more than $1 IO. This bill
would instead require the Board, for 1993
and 1994, to increase the annual membership fee by an additional fee of $110 to be
used exclusively for discipline augmentation; the bill would also extend the
repealer in the provision to January I,
1995.
Existing law provides that all membership fees for members of the State Bar be
paid into the treasury of the State Bar, and
when so paid, shall become part of its
funds. This bill would, in addition, provide that the Board of Governors may
make transfers from one fund of the State
Bar to another fund to pay all chargeable
expenses, as defined, for effectuating the
purposes of the State Bar Act. Funds collected from the additional membership fee
exclusively for discipline augmentation
would be excepted from this provision.
Finally, this bill would authorize the
Board to increase the membership fee for
inactive members from not more than $40
to not more than $50. [S. Jud]
AB 2970 (Borcher). Existing law,
which is operative until January I , 1993,
and then repealed on January 1, 1994, sets
forth requirements and restrictions relating to ownership and operation of lawyer
referral services. As amended April 8, this
bill would extend from July I, I 993, to
July 1, 1995, the date on which those
existing provisions become inoperative
and extend the January I, 1994 repeal date
to January I, 1996. [A. Floor]
AB 3150 (Borcher). Existing law
prohibits the making or dissemination of
untrue or misleading advertising to the
public concerning the performance of
professional services. Existmg law also
prohibits a person from advertising or
holding himself/herself out as practicing
or entitled to practice law who is not an
active member of the State Bar. As introduced February 20, this bill wou Id
prohibit false, misleading, deceptive, or
unfair communications, as specified, by
an attorney concerning the attorney or the
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attorney's services; regulate attorney advertising; prohibit agreements for, or the
collection of, fees by attorneys which are
generated through improper advertising or
solicitation; and establish the Standing
Committee on Advertising within the
State Bar to enforce these provisions
governing attorney advertising. [A. Jud]
AB 2300 (Umberg). Under existing
law, an order imposing public reproval or
other disciplinary against a member of the
State Bar is required to contain a direction
that the member pay costs, other than
attorneys' and expert witness fees; in the
event an attorney is exonerated of all charges following a formal hearing, he/she is
entitled to reimbursement from the State
Bar in an amount determined by the State
Bar to be the reasonable expenses, other
than fees for attorneys' or experts, of
preparation for the hearing. As amended
April I, this bill would provide that
attorneys' and expert witness fees are included in the costs of reimbursement. This
bill would also provide that any order
imposing a private or public reproval on a
member of the State Bar, imposing discipline, or accepting a resignation with a
disciplinary matter pending, may include
an order that the member pay a fine not to
exceed $ I0,000 per violation subject to a
maximum of$ I 00,000; these fines would
be deposited into the Bar's Client Security
Fund. This bill would require the State
Bar, with the approval of the Supreme
Court, to adopt rules setting forth
guidelines for the imposition of fines
under this provision. [S. Jud]
SB 1405 (Presley). Existing law
provides that hearings and records of State
·Bar Court disciplinary proceedings shall
be public, unless specifically provided,
except that all disciplinary investigations
are confidential until the time formal charges are filed. As amended April 30, this
bill would provide that certain types of
specified investigations are not confidential.
This bill would require the State Bar to
issue an Annual Discipline Report by
April 30 of each year, containing specified
information describing the performance
and condition of the State Bar discipline
system.
Existing law provides that in certain
cases, a written fee agreement or contract
containing specified information is required between an attorney and his/her
client. This bill would provide that the
agreement or contract disclose whether
the attorney maintains legal malpractice
insurance.
Existing law provides for the arbitration of fee or cost disputes between attorneys and clients; the arbitrator may award
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the client a refund of unearned prepaid
fees. This bill would provide that the arbitrator may award the client a refund of
unearned fees, costs, or both previously
paid to the attorney.
Existing law sets forth the limitations
period for the commencement of causes of
actions against attorneys, except that the
limitations period is tolled if the plaintiff
has not sustained actual injury; cases have
held that the limitations period is tolled
even when the plaintiff has sustained actual injury until the injury is irremediable
or appreciable. This bill would state the
intent of the legislature that the limitations
period is tolled only during the period that
the plaintiff has not sustained any actual
injury, and that any court rulings to the
contrary are abrogated. {A. Jud]
AB 683 (Moore), as amended April 1,
would establish a Legal Access Pilot Program and Advisory Commission within.
the Department of Consumer Affairs' Tax
Preparer Program to, among other things,
register and regulate nonlawyer "legal
technicians" providing legal assistance;
provide that the pilot program be implemented using existing Tax Preparer administration and support staff; and provide for an Advisory Commission to advise the Program Administrator, and
specify the duties and functions of the
Program Administrator and Commission.
[S. Jud]

AB 3818 (Chandler). Existing law
provides that a court which has assumed
jurisdiction over an attorney's law practice may order one or more active members of the Bar to, among other things,
notify persons and entities who appear to
be clients of the attorney, of the cessation
of the attorney's law practice. As introduced February 21, this bill would
authorize a court to direct the active members of the State Bar appointed to the court
to mail the notice of cessation of law practice. {S. Jud]
AB 3011 (Isenberg), as amended April
23, would have provided for the use of
alternative dispute resolution processes,
including mediation, neutral case evaluation, arbitration, minitrial, and neutral fact
finding, as a precursor to other proceedings in the determination of civil and some
criminal proceedings (see supra MAJOR
PROJECTS). This bill was rejected twice
by the Assembly Ways and Means Committee in May.
The following is a status update on
bills reported in detail in CRLR Vol. 12,
No. I (Winter 1992) at page 194:
AB 687 (Brown), as amended in May
1991, would provide that an attorney may
not be disciplined by the Bar for accepting
compensation for professional services in
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excess of specified fee limitations if the
client consents to the fee arrangement, a
court approves the fee arrangement, and
the fee arrangement is not the product of
fraud. The current version of AB 687 does
not require the attorney to disclose to
his/her client or the court the application
of a statutory fee limit. Hence, former
State Bar Discipline Monitor Robert
Fellmeth and the Bar's Discipline Committee oppose the bill, arguing that it
would preclude the discipline of attorneys
who knowingly charge unlawful fees. {S.
Jud]

SB 711 (Lockyer), as amended April 9,
would provide, as a matter of public
policy, that in certain actions based on
fraud, personal injury, or wrongful death
caused by a defective product or defined
environmental hazard, no part of any confidentiality agreement, settlement agreement, stipulated agreement, or protective
order, other than an initial protective or
discovery order pending conclusion of
litigation, shall be entered or enforceable,
other than as to provisions requiring nondisclosure of the amount of money paid to
settle the claim, unless a protective order
is entered by the court after a noticed
motion. This bill would also prohibit the
sale or offer for sale by an attorney of
information obtained through discovery.
[A. Floor]
AB 1689 (Filante ), as amended March
9, is no longer relevant to the State Bar.
SB 140 (Robbins), which would have
provided that the definition of an "athlete
agent" shall not include a member of the
Bar acting solely as legal counsel for any
person, and AB 168 (Eastin), which
would have provided for a new class of
legal practitioners called "legal technicians," died in committee.
LITIGATION:
On April 7, the challenge to the State
Bar's 1991 implementation of the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Keller v. State
Bar was resolved in favor of the Bar.
Arbitrator David Concepcion endorsed
the State Bar's calculation of its expenses
which were non-chargeable to Bar members as dues allocated to support political
activities during 1991. During the lengthy
arbitration proceeding, which wound to a
close in February, almost 200 State Bar
members challenged the sufficiency of the
Bar's $3 "Hudson deduction" refund of
compelled dues, the pro rata amount of the
Bar's $44 million budget which the Bar
claimed was spent on non-chargeable activities during I 991. The challengers argued that State Bar members were instead
entitled to a refund of $86.87 for 1991.
Concepcion ruled that less than 2% of

the Bar's budget is spent on political activities banned by the Keller decision. The
total additional non-chargeable amount in
four budget categories-ethnic minority
relations, Bar sections, governmental affairs, and general and administrative expenses-equaled $780.44, according to
Concepcion. Thus, each of the 179 challengers was allotted an additional $4.36
plus interest.
The most momentous case currently in
litigation relevant to the jurisdiction of the
State Bar is Rubin v. Green, 3 Cal. App.
4th 1418 (Feb. 16, 1992); the California
Supreme Court granted review in this case
on May 14, and oral argument is expected
this fall. This case arose after Norma
Green and other tenants of a mobilehome
park filed a class action lawsuit against
Gerald Rubin, the park owner, over a
variety of alleged mobilehome park rule
violations and lease breaches. Defendant
Rubin filed a countering civil complaint
against Norma Green and against the attorneys who filed the action on her behalf.
The complaint alleged that the attorneys
had "solicited" the mobilehome park
tenants as clients by "addressing meetings
of the tenants" and by "distributing questionnaires." The complaint alleged that the
attorneys made misstatements of fact
about Rubin, failed to use administrative
remedies, and filed a case before negotiating in good faith. The causes of action
included primarily the "interference in
business relations or prospective advantage" tort. The trial court sustained the
demurrers of Green and her attorneys,
citing the "litigation privilege" of counsel
as to communications.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed, with Justice McKinster dissenting. The decision holds that the specific
prohibitions on running and capping in the
State Bar Act, Business and Professions
Code sections 6152 and 6153, include improper solicitation and are more specific
than is the general litigation privilege of
Civil Code section 47(b). The court of
appeal held that they may be reconciled by
removing the privilege to the extent the
more specific violations may apply. Although sections 6152 and 6153 provide
only for criminal remedy, or for sanction
through the State Bar discipline system,
the majority derides the efficacy of these
remedies. It found instead that Rubin had
stated viable torts and that violations of
sections 6152 and 6153 are "unfair or
unlawful" acts in business within the
broad scope of California's "Little FTC
Act," Business and Professions Code section 17200, and therefore give rise to its
remedies of injunction and restitution.
Finally, the decision argued that the
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"litigation privilege" is limited to "communication" by attorneys, as with mailed
correspondence, and that where an attorney appears personally and talks, he or she
has engaged in conduct beyond communication.
The Center for Public Interest Law has
filed an amicus curiae brief in support of
defendant Green, arguing the following:
(I) The decision of the court of appeal
would allow counterclaims against attorneys based on any alleged violation of the
State Bar Act, encompassing over 226 sections, as well as any violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, since each may
be violated by personal communications
and since any of them may be "unfair" or
"unlawful." Such counterclaims are likely
to become commonplace as "SLAPP"
suits against poverty law, environmental,
and public interest attorneys. Such
retaliatory suits will require costly defense
by counsel often engaged in sacrificial pro
bono practice.
(2) The standards of professional behavior are enforced by a variety of means,
including criminal sanction, tort remedy,
discipline by the State Bar, and sanction
by the trial court. Some prohibitions are
enforced by one remedy and some by
others, but the decision of the court of
appeal would write onto all of them a tort
mechanism of enforcement although
specifically excluded from the prohibition
itself. That mechanism will create fragmented and inconsistent enforcement of
attorney standards and undermine the
recent reforms in the State Bar discipline
system designed to create consistent sanctions for wrongful acts.
(3) The decision under review would
engraft onto cases the ancillary adjudication of the behavior of counsel vis-a-vis
his/her own client, as well as possibly
many other issues, proliferating litigation
through a mechanism not ideally suited
for that function.
(4) The enforcement of standards of
behavior of counsel is not simply a "business practice" under section 17200, but
intersects with the administration of justice by the courts. The application of
remedies designed to address unfair business practices may not be suited to accomplish regulation of the profession
before the courts.
The public interest law community is
alarmed at the implications of the court of
appeal's decision in this case; however,
the opinion conflicts with several recent
decisions of the Supreme Court upholding
strongly the integrity of the litigation
privilege, including Silberg v. Anderson,
50 Cal. 3d 205 ( 1990).
In Howard v. Babcock, No. 0009931

(May 5, 1992), the Fourth District Court
of Appeal held that a non-competition
clause in a Jaw firm partnership agreement
violates the Rules of Professional Conduct. Four partners in Howard, Moss,
Babcock, Combs, Kinnett, Waddell &
Bergsten of Orange County left the firm in
1986 but continued to practice law in the
area, and took a number of clients with
them. The firm invoked the non-competition clause of the partnership agreement
and refused to pay withdrawal benefits or
the share of ongoing work and accounts
receivable to which the leaving partners
were entitled. The firm also sued to obtain
the net proceeds of work completed for
former clients of the firm. The Orange
County Superior Court upheld the noncompetition provision.
The court of appeal reversed. Although
Business and Professions Code section
I 6602 allows for limited agreements to
not compete with a previous employer, the
court held that Rule of Professional Conduct 1-500, precluding any private agreement that restricts the right of a member
of the State Bar from practicing law, applies. While limited agreements not to
compete may be permitted as to business
in general, they are not applicable to legal
practice. This decision conflicts with that
of the Second District Court of Appeal in
Haight v. Superior Court, 234 Cal. App.
3d 963 (1991), which upheld covenants
not to compete under Business and Professions Code section 16602. The issues
raised in Howard are likely to be addressed by the Supreme Court given the
clear conflict between the districts.
In Re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th 689 (Jan. 30,
1992), presented the Supreme Court with
a dilemma. In 1987, attorney Raymond
Hane was charged with four felony counts
of violating Penal Code section 288(a)
(committing lewd and lascivious acts on a
child under the age of 14). On March 4,
1988, Hane pied guilty. On April 6, 1988,
the Supreme Court received a copy of the
conviction record and under existing
policy immediately suspended his license
to practice for conviction of a crime of
"moral turpitude." While under this
suspension in March 1989, Hane agreed
to represent Johnson, who had been
charged with cocaine possession. Johnson
was convicted after trial, and sought reversal for violation of his right to counsel.
The Supreme Court held that conviction
of the applicable sex crimes and suspension from practice did not necessarily establish for Johnson denial of his constitutional right to counsel. The court discussed at length the different kinds of
moral turpitude-those which may
preclude effective assistance of counsel,
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and those which may warrant immediate
suspension for character unreliability in
carrying out the duties of an officer of the
court. The court opined, with a measure of
understandable discomfort, that the sexual
deviance and crimes of the attorney certainly offend the latter standards, but do
not necessarily deny the person availing
himself of attorney Hane's legal services
the right to effective assistance to counsel.
The First District Court of Appeal has
backed strict application of conflict of interest standards for attorneys in Truck Insurance Exchange v. Fireman's Fund
Insurance Company, 6 Cal. App. 4th
I 050 (May 21, 1992). In this case, defendant Fireman's Fund moved successfully
to disqualify the Jaw firm of Crosby,
Heafey, Roach & May from acting as
counsel for plaintiff Truck Insurance Exchange because the firm was representing
Fireman's Fund in several wrongful termination cases and had not been given
written consent by Fireman's Fund to represent another party suing it. However,
after the firm began representing Truck
Insurance Exchange, it withdrew as counsel for Fireman's Fund, removing the conflict. Conflicts where a law firm represents
someone suing a former client tum on
whether the previous representation of the
party being sued would compromise confidential information previously shared
between the former client and attorney
now representing an adverse interest. In
this case, there was no compromise of
confidences from Fireman's to the firm
(involving entirely separate personnel and
matters). However, the court barred the
representation nevertheless, finding that a
per se disqualification occurred when the
firm began representation of Truck Insurance against Fireman's Fund atthe time
Fireman's Fund was a client on other matters. Withdrawal did not cure a perfected
violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. The firm's duty of loyalty was
breached and was not restored through
mere withdrawal.
Another decision applying strict standards to attorney practice was handed down
by the Fourth District Court of Appeal on
January 31. In Lewis v. Stern, Cook &
Naiditch, No. 0009639, the court revived
a malpractice case against a firm which
deliberately dropped a case in the middle
of an appeal because "the bill had not been
paid." Although the case is unpublished,
its message was no Jess heard within the
Bar.
Three attorneys have filed suit to stop
the State Bar's program requiring minimum continuing legal education (MCLE)
to practice Jaw. The case, Greenberg v.
State Bar of California, No. 682931-9, is
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pending in Alameda County Superior
Court. Plaintiffs allege that compelled
classes on substance abuse and bias violate their first amendment rights. Plaintiffs
have punctuated their lawsuit with
rhetoric about the "re-education camps"
of the former Soviet Union. The case also
challenges the exemptions to MCLE for
judges, elected officials, law professors,
and administrative law judges.

FUTURE MEETINGS:
August 13-15 in San Francisco.
September I 7-19 in San Francisco.
October 2-5 in San Francisco.
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